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Abstract 
Theoretical work on state formation and capacity has focused mostly on early modern Europe 
and on the experience of western European states during this period. While a number of 
European states monopolized domestic tax collection and achieved gains in state capacity 
during the early modern era, for others revenues stagnated or even declined, and these 
variations motivated alternative hypotheses for determinants of fiscal and state capacity. In 
this study we test the basic hypotheses in the existing literature making use of the large date 
set we have compiled for all of the leading states across the continent. We find strong 
empirical support for two prevailing threads in the literature, arguing respectively that 
interstate wars and changes in economic structure towards an urbanized economy had 
positive fiscal impact. Regarding the main point of contention in the theoretical literature, 
whether it was representative or authoritarian political regimes that facilitated the gains in 
fiscal capacity, we do not find conclusive evidence that one performed better than the other. 
Instead, the empirical evidence we have gathered lends supports to the hypothesis that when 
under pressure of war, the fiscal performance of representative regimes was better in the 
more urbanized-commercial economies and the fiscal performance of authoritarian regimes 
was better in rural-agrarian economies.  
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Different Paths to the Modern State 
in Europe: The interaction between 
domestic political economy and 
interstate competition 
 
1. Introduction  
The process through which early modern European states monopolized tax 
collection and achieved gains in fiscal capacity has been at the centre of the study of 
state formation. What were the drivers of and the mechanisms for the consolidation 
of states’ fiscal capacity? Did changes in economic structure and warfare play a role 
in state formation? Was it representative or authoritarian regimes that facilitated 
gains in fiscal and state capacity? These questions have been central not only to the 
study of politics1, but also to understanding the economic development process.2 
In investigating these questions, both theoretical and empirical literatures have 
mainly focused on evidence from early modern Europe, because it was states in 
Europe that were the first to permanently break cycles of gains and losses in 
centralized fiscal and coercive capacity and build towards the modern state system. 
In this article, we discuss and categorize the various threads in the theoretical 
literature, empirically investigate alternative hypotheses based on a new and 
comprehensive tax revenue dataset we have recently compiled, and find support for 
a formulation that emphasizes the interaction between domestic political economy 
and interstate competition.  
                                                        
1 See Bonney (1999), Ertman (1997), Evans et. al. (1985), Finer (1997), Spruyt (2002), Storrs 
(2009), Tilly (1990), Vu (2010) and other works cited in the text. 
2 Epstein (2000), Acemoglu (2005), North et al. (2009), Besley and Persson (2010).   
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We begin by reviewing the long-term trends in fiscal capacity for eleven major 
European states during the early modern era. Specifically, we present figures for 
central treasury revenues in silver which can be viewed as the common monetary 
unit of account for the period and place them in the context of changes in population, 
prices and per capita incomes. The evidence corroborates a continent-wide trend of 
increase in centralized fiscal capacity that was significantly above and beyond the 
gains in average incomes. However, the patterns also suggest that not all states 
achieved fiscal gains, and among those that did, there were significant differences in 
the timing and extent of the gains.  
To identify alternative explanations for these historical patterns and put them to test, 
we turn to theories of state formation in historical sociology and political science 
literatures. In the first stage of the analysis, we evaluate four hypotheses. Specifically, 
we discuss the arguments that posit changes in economic structure and warfare 
increased fiscal capacity, and the two hypotheses for political regime that 
alternatively posit that representative regimes performed better or worse than 
authoritarian regimes. The econometric evidence is consistent with positive impact of 
warfare and changes in economic structure, but does not conclusively lend support 
to a positive or negative impact for representation. 
To address the theoretical and empirical ambiguity regarding the fiscal impact of 
political regime, in the second and third stage of the analysis we discuss and 
investigate finer hypotheses that emphasize the interaction of political regime with 
other determinants of fiscal capacity. The hypothesis that we find empirical support 
for is that for financing the main expenditure item, warfare, urbanization increased 
the effectiveness of and the prospect for taxation by seeking consent. This was so, 
because urbanization and commercialization altered the elite incentives and 
capability to seek centralized provision of national security and interstate warfare. 
Consequently, it was representative regimes in urbanized and authoritarian regimes 
in rural economies that tended to perform better in financing and transforming 
warfare into state building.  Hence, political regime mattered, but in a contingent 
way.  
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These findings are consistent with a nuanced view of the state-building process. For 
the fiscal impact of political regime, they enable us to reconcile two distinct views. 
Whig history and more recently the New Institutionalist literature, building mainly 
on the Western European experience, have argued that representative regimes were 
more effective in responding to demands of intense early modern warfare, whereas 
studies that focus on Central and Eastern Europe have argued the opposite. We find 
that these arguments are not inconsistent, once the differences in the economic 
structure and elite incentives in the two regions are taken into account. 
Consequently, our findings explain why certain states with urban economies 
achieved state consolidation through representative regimes (e.g. urban England, the 
Dutch Republic), while others with rural economies did so through authoritarian 
regimes (e.g. rural Russia, Prussia), and yet others with rural economies and 
representative regimes collapsed under pressure of war (e.g. rural Polish-Lithuania, 
Kingdom of  Hungary).  
 
2. Revenue Patterns in Early Modern Europe  
In this section we first describe the tax revenue dataset we have compiled for leading 
European states. We then provide an overview of patterns in total tax revenues and 
per capita tax revenues during the early modern period based on this data set. Lastly, 
we discuss the figures for per capita tax revenues divided by per capita incomes, 
widely employed in the empirical literature as the proxy for state capacity.3  We 
establish that the patterns for this last measure are consistent with continent-wide 
gains in centralized fiscal and state capacity during the early modern era.  
For this study, we have compiled annual central treasury tax revenue figures for 
England, France, the Dutch Republic, Spain, Venice, Austrian Habsburgs, Prussia, 
Russia, Sweden, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, from 
the early part of the sixteenth century until the end of the eighteenth century and 
                                                        
3 Hendrix (2010), Lieberman (2002). 
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4 
then until World War I. We have converted all monetary magnitudes into tons of 
silver by multiplying the annual magnitudes in the current monetary units of 
account in each polity with the silver content of the unit of account for that year. We 
have taken great care to apply similar definitions of revenue to all the states, but the 
limitations imposed by the variations in accounting procedures and fiscal structures 
should be kept in mind.  
Figure 1: Annual Revenues of European States, 50-year averages in tons of silver 
 
Figure 1 presents 50–year averages of annual total central treasury revenues of the 
leading European states during the early modern era. It makes clear that central 
treasury revenues of most European states increased sharply during the seventeenth 
and especially the eighteenth centuries and these revenue patterns are consistent 
with the historical shifts in the interstate power balance. Most striking in this respect 
was England where total revenues of the central administration, in tons of silver, 
increased by more than 40 times between the middle of the sixteenth century and the 
end of the eighteenth century. In France, total revenues of the central administration 
increased by more than 12 times. In the Dutch Republic, total revenues began at a 
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much higher level and increased by 4 times. Outside Western Europe, revenues of 
some but not all states also showed significant increases. In Austria, total revenues 
increased by 12 times from the middle of the seventeenth century until the end of the 
eighteenth century. In Russia further to the east, total central revenues rose by more 
than 8 times. Interstate differences in total revenue figures reached their peak during 
the second half of the eighteenth century when the revenues not only of the more 
successful and more powerful states in Western Europe but also of those in central 
and Eastern Europe such as Austrian Monarchy and Russia showed their most rapid 
increases. 
Equation 1: Total Tax Revenues in Tons of Silver = Population * Price 
Level * Real Income Per Capita * Real Tax Revenues Per Capita as a per 
cent of Real Income Per Capita  
As Equation 1 makes clear, changes in total tax revenues were not necessarily driven 
by gains in state capacity. In particular, it is possible to distinguish between the 
changes in total revenues due to changes in socioeconomic variables (i.e. population, 
price level and real income per capita) and changes in state capacity, as measured by 
the tax revenues over income ratio.  
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Figure 2: Annual Revenues per capita, 50-year averages in grams of silver 
 
Figure 2 presents the averages for central per capita tax revenues in grams of silver.4 
Adjusting for population and population growth alters the cross-polity rankings. 
Small, urbanized polities such as England, the Dutch Republic and Venice fare better 
in per capita terms. However, the trend of gains in taxation over time is still robust 
for most polities. For England, per capita revenues, in grams of silver, increased by 
more than 20 times from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the 
eighteenth century. In France, per capita revenues increased by 7 times during the 
same period. In the Dutch Republic, per capita revenues increased by 3 times from 
the beginning of the seventeenth until the end of the eighteenth century.  In Austria 
and Russia, per capita revenues increased by 4 and 2 times respectively during the 
eighteenth century. 
Lastly, to control for changes in price level in silver and average real incomes, we 
divide the annual per capita central tax revenues in silver by the daily wages of 
                                                        
4 Populations of most but not all European states in our sample increased during the early 
modern era, mainly for Northwestern Europe, and, with a lag, for Eastern Europe. See McEvedy 
and Jones (1978).  
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unskilled workers in silver. 5 There were significant variations across polities and 
over time in price levels in silver and in real incomes during the early modern era.6  
The daily wages of unskilled urban workers in grams of silver capture the changes in 
both, are available annually for most polities and in the absence of reliable estimates 
for per capita income, are frequently used by economic historians as a proxy for per 
capita income for this period. 7 
Figure 3: Annual Revenue per capita / Daily Urban Wage, 50-year averages 
 
Figure 3 presents per capita tax revenues in days of unskilled workers’ wages, our 
proxy for state capacity. It makes clear that, except for Poland-Lithuania and the 
                                                        
5 Allen (2001), Özmucur and Pamuk (2002). 
6 In the early part of the early modern era, price levels were higher in southern Europe than the 
rest of the continent. During the early modern centuries, however, price levels in northwestern 
and more generally western Europe increased more rapidly, by as much as 4 fold as rising 
incomes and wages tended to pull up the prices of services and other non-tradable goods. There 
emerged, as a result, significant differences in the price levels between western Europe and the 
rest of the continent by the second half of the eighteenth century. Incomes rose rapidly in 
England and the Dutch Republic during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In contrast, 
recent findings suggest that per capita GDP in the rest of the continent did not show any strong 
trend during the early modern era, rising to some extent in Western Europe but probably 
declining in southern Europe, especially in Italy. See Van Zanden (2000), Alvarez-Nogal and de la 
Escosura (2007), Maddison (2007). 
7 For example, Allen (2001) and Van Zanden and Prak (2006). 
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Ottomans, there was a strong pattern of gains in state capacity across Europe during 
the early modern centuries. Figure 3 also indicates that gains in centralized state 
capacity proceeded quite unevenly across the continent. During the first half of the 
sixteenth century, annual tax revenues per capita did not exceed 5 days of unskilled 
urban wages in most European countries. The only exceptions were the small and 
highly urbanized entities such as Venice and Holland. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, however, differences in fiscal centralization across Europe had increased 
substantially. While the annual per capita revenues of some central administrations 
such as Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire still remained below 5 days of 
urban wages, many others had reached the 10 to 15 daily wages range and annual 
per capita revenues of the central administration in the Dutch Republic exceeded 20 
days of urban wages. It is worth noting that the middle group where annual per 
capita revenues reached 10 to 15 daily wages included not only the more urbanized 
western European countries such as England, France, Spain and Venice but also the 
more rural and agricultural countries in central and eastern Europe such as Austria 
and.8 These broad trends make clear that the increases in the fiscal capabilities of 
centralized administrations preceded the Industrial Revolution and the onset of 
modern economic growth in the 19th century. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 In controlling for changes in per capita incomes, an alternative approach would be to divide per 
capita tax revenues by per capita GDP figures. The trends we identified are robust for this 
alternative measure for state capacity.  We estimate that tax revenues of the central 
administrations as a per cent of GDP rose in most European countries from less than 5 per cent in 
the sixteenth century to a range between 5 and 10 per cent and in a small number of cases that 
include Britain and the Netherlands to more than 10 per cent by the end of the eighteenth 
century. See, for example, P. K. O’Brien and Hunt (1993). We prefer to work with wages rather 
than per capita GDP figures since the quality of the existing GDP estimates for the early modern 
era are not very good and they are available only for some benchmark years.   
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3. Theories of State Formation in Early Modern Europe  
The long term trends we reviewed in the previous section indicate that state 
revenues increased more rapidly than taxable resources and state capacity grew 
faster than the economy in early modern Europe. These findings raise questions 
about the basic causes of this broad trend. To investigate the issue, we provide below 
first a framework for analysing the domestic political bargain over taxation during 
the early modern era and then summarize the main arguments in historical sociology 
and political science literatures that aim to explain the rise in centralized state 
capacity.  
One critical observation for understanding the rise of states in early modern Europe 
is that they were the outcome of bargains between central administrations and 
domestic elites over the mobilization and use of domestic economic resources. Until 
the 19th century, the primary activity of the central administrations, which were 
often, but necessarily, controlled by a ruler, was extracting economic resources 
through taxation and spending them for the upkeep of the coercive apparatus.  Both 
in mobilizing resources and maintaining the coercive apparatus, rulers fostered 
relationships with domestic elites that were de facto and de jure distinct from the royal 
apparatus. More specifically, in assessing, collecting and spending taxes and in the 
provisioning and command of the coercive apparatus, rulers worked with domestic 
elites as vassals, functionaries, officials, corporations, councils, tax farmers. However, 
incentives of the rulers and elites were only partly aligned in these relationships. 
While complementary competencies or mutual interests against rival states drove the 
alignment, the relationships also had a redistributive conflict dimension, since each 
party ultimately attempted to maximize his share in the final allocation of economy’s 
mobilized resources.9 The degree of alignment and conflict in interests, and the 
leverages of political actors in the redistributive dimension of the relationships 
differed from one polity to another and in different periods. 
                                                        
9 Karaman (2009), Kiser (1986-87), Lachmann (2000), Volckart (2000). 
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In explaining how the nature of the intra-elite bargain that characterized the state 
apparatus changed and gains in centralized fiscal capacity occurred, a major thread 
in the literature identifies the changes in economic structure through the early 
modern era as the prime mover. In these explanations, state figures chiefly as an 
instrument of domestic elites and it is argued that changes in the structure of 
domestic economy induced the decomposition of the feudal state and realigned 
societal forces towards a centralized state apparatus.10 At the heart of this argument 
lies the notion that urbanization, rise of domestic and international overseas trade 
and increasing commercialization of the factors of production and taxable resources, 
namely land, labour and capital, favoured centralized control over coercion and 
provisioning of public goods. For example, in his discussion of Western Europe, 
Anderson argues that the rise of centralized monarchies in early modern period was 
due to the reorganization of aristocratic power to retain its privileged position in a 
more centralized fashion.11 According to this argument, the decomposition of 
feudalism, and the rise of towns and markets undermined the aristocracy’s coercion 
based extractive capacity at the village level. Their role was taken on by the rising 
monarchies, which then served to mobilize resources at the scale of newly forming 
nations. Similarly, Wallerstein argues the rise of strong states in Europe occurred 
concurrently with early stages of capitalism. In the “core” areas, the richer and more 
complex societies facilitated more differentiated and effective states. 12  Formally: 
H1: Urbanization, which was at the nexus of changes in economic 
structure, had a positive impact on centralized fiscal capacity. 
A second line of argument emphasizes the role played by interstate warfare and 
competition in driving the gains in centralized fiscal capacity.13 At the core of this 
argument is the claim that interstate warfare of the early modern era set in motion 
innovations in military technology, training, and tactics that favored centralized 
                                                        
10 Gourevitch (1978). 
11 Anderson (1979). 
12 Wallerstein (1974). 
13 Ames and Rapp (1977), Bean (1973), Besley and Persson (2008), Peacock and Wiseman 
(1961), Rasler and Thomson (1985), Rasler and Thomson (1999), Tilly (1990). For extensions of 
the argument to the modern period, see Centeno (2002) for Latin America, Lustick (1997) for the 
Middle East and Herbst  (2000) for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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modes of coercive organization and demanded standing armies of ever greater size 
and cost. In turn, the pressure to provision and manage these armies induced 
experimentation and advances in fiscal, military and administrative methods and 
these gains formed the backbone of the modern state.14 These changes were ad hoc 
responses to exigencies of warfare and thus gains were often piecemeal and limited. 
In Europe, however, the existence of multiple core agricultural areas, large islands 
and mountain ranges that divide up the continent facilitated a fragmented state 
system, more or less continuous warfare and ensured that the gains accumulated 
over time.15 In its most basic formulation, the above considerations suggest the 
following hypothesis:  
H2: Interstate warfare and competition had a positive impact on 
centralized fiscal capacity. 
As for the investigation of the impact of political regime, the focus is on 
characterizing the ruler and his administrative apparatus’ relationship with the 
domestic elites, as until the 19th century politics was an intra-elite game that excluded 
the masses. For this relationship, we identify the relevant theoretical distinction as 
between representative regimes, where the bargain between ruler and elites was 
collective and formal, and authoritarian regimes, where it was bilateral and 
particularistic.  Specifically, an inclusive representative assembly of domestic elites 
provided a venue for information sharing, intra-elite coordination, and sanctioning 
of deviant members. This, in turn, increased the capacity of elites to formulate 
policies separate from the ruler, solve collective action problems and credibly act in 
unison. 16 In the longer run, the existence of an assembly also enhanced elite 
competencies by allowing for an autonomous organizational structure and paved the 
way for organizational innovations. The contrast is with authoritarian regimes, 
where the domestic bargain was between the ruler and individuals or particular elite 
                                                        
14 Hintze (1975). 
15 In contrast, in East Asia, where warfare was episodic and the gains in military technology and 
organization during episodes of war were followed by stagnation and decay during long episodes 
of peace. See McNeill (1982) and Morillo (1995).  
16 See Greif et. al. (1994) for a theoretical analysis of the impact of coordination and commitment 
capacity of sides to a bargain on the bargaining outcomes. 
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groups, the arrangements were often informal and the ruler retained the capacity to 
reward, punish and play elites against each other.17 Consequently, in authoritarian 
regimes, the elites lacked sophisticated organizational forms to formulate policies 
and credibly coordinate on actions other than those formulated by rulers.  
Based on this distinction, there are conflicting hypotheses regarding the relative 
fiscal performances of authoritarian and representative regimes.18 One line of 
argument contends that authoritarian regimes were more effective in raising 
revenues. The premise of this argument is that domestic extraction and allocation of 
resources ultimately rested on compulsion through force, and not on consent. 
Authoritarian regimes, due to absence of coordinated resistance, were better able to 
pass laws that broadened the tax net, compel interest groups to behave in ways that 
countered their interests and suppress their activities to obtain exemptions and 
favors. For early modern Europe, this line of argument invokes the experiences of 
continental European polities including Poland-Lithuania, Austrian Habsburgs and 
Prussia, characterizes representative bodies in these polities as nodes of resistance 
against fiscal centralization, and posits a causal link between the degree to which 
rulers reigned in on their prerogatives and the gains in fiscal capacity. This implies 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: Representative regime had a negative impact on centralized fiscal 
capacity. 
On the other hand, those who argue that representative regimes had a positive effect 
on tax revenues focus on the role of consent in reducing the costs of compliance. 19 In 
this tradition, what limited the ruler’s tax extraction capacity was taxpayers’ ability 
to withhold payments and increase costs of collection. Accordingly, representative 
regimes solved collective action and free-rider problems among the taxpayers, 
permitted better transmission of information, reduced costs of negotiation, 
measurement and monitoring, lent legitimacy to taxation and allowed credible 
commitment. As cases to the point, this line of argument invokes the representative 
                                                        
17 See, among others, Hellie (2000) for Russia, Barkey (1994) for the Ottomans,   
18 Cheibub (1998). 
19 North (1981), Levi (1988), Dincecco (2009). 
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regimes and fiscal successes of the Dutch Republic and England after Glorious 
Revolution and compares them favourably with the authoritarian regimes and fiscal 
demise of Spain and France.20 Formally: 
H4: Representative regime had a positive impact on centralized fiscal 
capacity. 
 
4. Testing the Theories 
The theories for gains in state capacity, outlined in the preceding section, have been 
put to test in a number of empirical studies.21 The predominant approach in this 
literature has been to introduce a proxy for the conjectured cause of gains in fiscal 
capacity and evaluate its impact. In the first stage of our analysis, we adopt a similar 
but more comprehensive approach both in terms of methodology and data. Since our 
goal is to identify the independent contribution of the three conjectured 
determinants, we treat them symmetrically and estimate their impacts 
simultaneously. As for the data, we employ the dataset that we have compiled 
covering the nine Great Powers for Early Modern era as identified by Levy (1982) 
and Venice through the early modern period. In the rest of this section, we describe 
the dataset, the variables, the econometric models employed, and present the first 
stage of our results.  
 
 
 
                                                        
20 Hoffman and Norberg (1994). 
21 Among others, Rasler and Thompson (1985) and (1999) test impact of wars for revenue series 
of Britain starting 1700, France after 1815, the US after 1792 and Japan after 1878 and find that 
global wars had a transformative impact.  Dincecco (2009) constructs revenue series mainly for 
Western European countries after 1650 and finds that the introduction of constraints on the 
executive had a positive impact on tax revenues per capita.  Thies (2005) shows a positive 
relationship between interstate rivalry and tax revenues for 19th century Latin America. Cheibub 
(1998), Ross (2004), Timmons (2005) investigate the impact of political regime and Lektzian 
(2008) and Thies (2007) the impact of interstate competition on tax revenues based on 20th 
century data.   
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Data and Variables 
We investigate below the determinants of the centralized taxation capacity for 
between1500-1799. We use decennial averages of both the dependent and 
independent variables in order to compensate for the quality of data and not 
artificially inflate the significance of the regression results.  Due to quality of data 
and missing data for one or more variables certain periods and countries drop out of 
the sample.22 Coupled with econometric requirements, the available number of 
observations ranges between 120-179 depending on the particular model we 
estimate.  
The dependent variable is log decade average of per capita tax revenues divided by 
decade average of wages (logPctrw).  As discussed in section 2, tax revenues per 
capita, adjusted for measures of income, is the most common proxy for state capacity 
in the empirical literature. This is so, because the share of a polity’s resources 
collected as taxes by the central administration measures both its extractive capacity 
and the limits of the policies it can implement.  
Economic structure argument (H1) posits that rise of domestic and international 
trade, sectoral shifts, commodification of labor and monetization altered domestic 
organization of finances and coercion. Since urbanization was at the nexus of these 
economic changes, our main proxy is urbanization rates from de Vries (1984). De 
Vries provides the most detailed data for the period, available for each half century. 
In different regressions, we employ interpolated urbanization rates for each decade 
(Urbdec) or half century averages (Urbhc).  
To investigate the impact of interstate warfare on fiscal capacity (H2), we construct 
two proxies for war pressure. The main proxy, distance weighted pressure of war 
(Dwpwar), takes into account the ratio of the total causality due to war to total 
population of the belligerents, the coalitions of belligerents and the distance matrix 
                                                        
22 We exclude Poland-Lithuania due to time consistency issues for the items included in the tax 
revenue series. For France, the last decade of 18th century drops out due to monetary fluctuations 
and measurement issues for revenues. For Austria and Prussia, the observations for respectively 
1700-1739 and 1610-1659 are excluded because of the measurement issues for population due 
to rapid territorial gains and losses.  
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between the capital cities of the belligerents. The alternative proxy, pressure of war 
(Pwar) is similar except that it does not take the distance matrix into account.23 
To investigate the impact of political regime on fiscal capacity (H3 and H4), we 
employ two different proxies for representativeness of regime coded by different 
authors. Our main proxy is an index of the activity of parliaments (Parl) by Bosker, 
Buringh and Van Zanden (2011), rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. The second (Ctax) 
is constructed by Stasavage (2010) and takes the value 1 if there is a representative 
assembly in a polity with the prerogative to consent to taxation at a given decade and 
0 otherwise. For both proxies, a higher score corresponds to a higher level of political 
representation.  
In all specifications, we added fixed effects for each polity and each decade. The 
polity fixed effects allow controlling for any omitted polity specific effects that do not 
vary over time, such as geofigureical attributes and any time persistent differences in 
the conventions used for recording tax revenues. The decade fixed effects allow 
controlling for omitted common shocks and trends such as gains in transportation, 
communication, information technologies. Hence, the regression results are driven 
by the variation the explanatory variables exhibit for each polity over time after 
controlling for continent-wide trends. 
In various econometric specifications, we include log population density 
(logPopdens) and log silver wages (logNomwage) as control variables. We do so to 
control for the possibility that a change in either of these variables may lead to a 
more or less than proportional change in per capita tax revenues.24  We also include 
                                                        
23 See the appendix for details. 
24 The literature is ambiguous on whether an increase in population density necessitates 
additional layers of government, increases transaction costs and thus decreases per capita tax 
collection or whether it induces economies of scale in tax collection and increases it. On the 
expense side, since the largest item, national defense, exhibits economies of scale, a growing 
population may have a negative effect on per capita burden. As for an increase in average wage, 
since incomes were close to subsistence level during the early modern era, it may lead to more 
than proportional increases in per capita revenues. 
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log book production per capita25 (logBookprod) as a regressor, to control for the 
impact of changes in human capital on state capacity. 
 
Econometric Model and Empirical Analysis 
Our base econometric specification is OLS with polity and decade fixed effects and 
panel corrected standard errors. We assume that the disturbances are heteroscedastic 
across panels, there is a common autocorrelation term for all panels and no 
contemporaneous correlation across panels. The last two assumptions are 
appropriate and necessary, because the gaps in the data reduce the number of 
consecutive observations for each polity and common period effects are controlled 
for by decade dummies. The equation we estimate is: 
rit  αi  βt  Xit′ γ θ1Urbit  θ2Warit  θ3Reprit  εit  
where rit is log of per capita tax revenue over wage ratio for polity i in period t, and 
αi	and		βt are polity and period fixed effects,	Xit′ are control variables. ForUrbit, 
urbanization rate, Warit,  the pressure of warfare and   Reprit, the representativeness 
of political regime, we employ different proxies in different specifications. εit is the 
disturbance term that exhibits heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Table 1 reports the first set of regression results.  In all 6 specifications, the dependent 
variable is log per capita tax revenue over wage ratio (logPctrw).  In specification 1, 
urbanization rate for each decade (Urbdec), distance weighted pressure of war 
(Dwpwar), the index for activity of parliaments (Parl), the full set of polity dummies 
and decade dummies except for 1500-09 are included as regressors. In specification 2, 
control variables lagged log population density (L.logPopdens) lagged log nominal 
wages of urban construction of workers (L.logNomwage) and log per capita book 
production (logBookprod) are also included as regressors. In specification 3, 
alternative proxies for theories of state formation are employed:  half century 
                                                        
25 The figures are based on Babinger (2004), Beydilli (1995) and Kut (1996) for the Ottomans 
and Baten and Van Zanden (2008) for other polities. 
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averages of urbanization rates (Urbhc), war pressure that is not distance weighted 
(Pwar) and existence of an assembly with prerogatives over taxation (Ctax). 
Specification 4 is similar to specification 3 except that additional control variables are 
included as regressors. In specification 5, we drop England from the sample. We do 
so because our proxies for war pressure do not account for the fact that England was 
an island and hence they may overstate the pressure. In specification 6 we drop 
Prussia, Sweden and Russia from the sample to alleviate two concerns. For these 
polities revenue series are available starting from later 17th or early 18th century, and 
if the late availability of revenue series was due to variables other than those we 
include in our estimations, this would cause a selection bias. Secondly, the implicit 
assumption in our empirical framework is that the impact of war pressure was 
quantitatively the same across different polities and periods. It could be argued, 
however, that for these latecomers war pressure had a greater impact, because by the 
time the war pressure levels began to rise in peripheral regions of Europe, they had 
access to a greater accumulated body of military and fiscal knowledge to draw on. 
The reported estimates for L.logPopdens and L.logNomwage, which enter the 
regression in log form, are elasticities. For the other regressors, we report semi-
elasticities.  
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The empirical findings are consistent across these 6 specifications. Proxies for 
urbanization are significant at 0.1 per cent.  This finding is robust when nominal 
wage is included as regressor, despite the fact that wage captures similar trends, is 
available for each decade and thus less subject to measurement errors than 
urbanization. The evidence also suggests the impact of urbanization (H1) is 
substantial. To get a sense of the magnitudes involved, consider specification 1. All 
else being equal, it is estimated that a one per cent increase in urbanization rate led to 
8.126 log points or roughly 8.5 per cent increase in per capita tax over wage ratios. 
Likewise, we find strong support for positive impact of wars on centralized fiscal 
capacity (H2), significant at 10 per cent or higher levels. Both the significance levels 
and the estimated magnitude of impact is greater when the distance weighted proxy 
for war pressure (Dwpwar) is employed. To give an idea of the size of the impact, for 
specification 1, one per cent increase in distance weighted pressure of war has an 
estimated impact of 0.484 log points or 0.49 per cent on the dependent variable. This 
arguably is a lower limit on wars’ impact on state building, since the econometric 
specification only accounts for an instantaneous and polity specific effect. However, 
many of the wars in the sample involved a large number of polities, and any 
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innovations due to war were transferred and adopted across the continent.26  Such 
continent-wide impacts are soaked up by decade dummies.27   
Lastly, for representation, we do not find evidence of a negative (H3) or a positive 
(H4) impact. In particular, the estimated coefficient carries a negative sign in four 
and positive sign in two specifications, and is insignificant at 10 per cent level in all.28   
 
Alternative Econometric Specifications 
In the econometric models summarized in Table 1, the persistence of fiscal capacity 
from one decade to the next is accounted by a serial correlation in the error term.  An 
alternative approach would be to model it by including the lagged value of the 
dependent variable as a regressor. There are two main econometric models for doing 
so. The first of these is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with lagged dependent 
variable, two-way fixed effects and panel corrected standard errors. Specifically, the 
regression equation is:   
rit  rit1  αi  βt  Xit′ γ θ1Urbit  θ2Warit  θ3Reprit  εit  
where rit1  is the log of per capita tax revenue over wage ratio for polity i in t-1 and 
εit is the disturbance term that exhibits heteroskedasticity. The second model is 
Arellano Bond difference GMM with orthogonal deviations and lagged dependent 
variable. Since most countries in our sample have a large number of periods, 
Arellano Bond estimation is considered less appropriate here, but we also report the 
results for it.29 
                                                        
26 See, for example, Lynn (1985). 
27 Consistent with the argument, the estimates of decade dummies in all specifications, not reported 
for lack of space, identify a trend of increase. 
28 These regression results are robust to employing different subsets and combinations of the 
proxies for the theories of state formation and the control variables as regressors, not reported 
here for the sake of brevity. We also tried controlling for changes in average income by including 
real wage as opposed to nominal wage as a regressor and the regression results were similar. 
29  When fixed effects and lagged dependent variable are both included in the OLS regression, 
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, and this creates a downward bias in 
the coefficient (Nickell 1981). However, as number of periods increase, dynamic panel bias gets 
smaller and OLS is more efficient than IV estimation. Arellano Bond is unbiased, and also permits 
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Table 2 presents findings consistent with the baseline specification. Specifications 1-4 
and 5-6 are respectively dynamic OLS and Arellano Bond estimation results for 
different proxies of urbanization, war pressure and representation. In all, 
urbanization and war pressure have positive and significant impacts. Representation 
has a positive coefficient and is marginally significant at 10 per cent level in 
specification 5, and is insignificant for the other five specifications. 
 
Another concern with the estimation results is endogeneity due to reverse causation 
or omitted variable bias. With respect to representation, for example, if a tax hike by 
an authoritarian regime creates dissent, leads to revolution and switch to a 
representative regime, this would lead to positive bias. Alternatively, if windfall 
revenues from sources external to the domestic bargaining, such as revenues from 
silver shipments from colonies to Spanish Monarchs, induced the ruler to suppress 
the activities of representative assemblies, this would introduce a negative bias. 
Urbanization is also susceptible to endogeneity concerns. For example, a higher 
centralized fiscal capacity, if it induces gains in public security, would encourage 
                                                                                                                                                              
IV estimation for the lagged dependent variable and other regressors employing their lagged 
values as instruments.  As the number of periods increases, however, the proliferation of the 
number of instruments undermines the statistical power of Sargan test for their validity. To limit 
the extent of this problem, unless otherwise stated, we restrict the choice of instruments to a 
single lag. See Beck and Katz (2009), Roodman (2009), and Wawro (2002). 
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market activity and urbanization. 30 To alleviate these concerns and as a general 
robustness check, we try two empirical strategies. In specifications 1-4 in table 3, we 
report the results for 2- Stage Least Squares estimation where the proxies for 
urbanization and representation are instrumented by their lagged values.31 In 
specifications 5 and 6, we adopt the less formal strategy of including the lagged 
values of representation and urbanization as regressors. The results for five of the six 
specifications are consistent with the baseline findings in identifying positive and 
significant impacts for urbanization and war pressure and insignificant impact for 
representation.32    
 
                                                        
30 For a number of reasons, the case for endogeneity of war pressure is weaker. Since the 
regression equation includes two-way fixed effects, the source variation that drives the results is 
the variation in decennial war pressures after averaging out country means and decade means. 
Hence, the impacts of omitted variables such as geofigurey and level of military technology are 
controlled for to the extent that their impacts are time persistent or common to different polities. 
Furthermore, historical evidence suggests, while these and other omitted factors induced the 
rivalries and tensions between the polities, the actual onset and end to wars and thus the decade 
to decade variation was largely driven by a number of random factors such as personality traits 
or health of monarchs. As for a reverse causation channel from per capita tax revenues to 
warfare, the argument that wars were driven by perceptions of power balance rather than the 
power balance itself works against it. See Blainey (1988), Fearon (1995). 
31 Since these variables are not coded for each decade, we use 5 decade lagged values of Urbdec 
and Ctax and 10 decade lagged value of Parl as instruments. 
32 The exception is specification 4, where urbanization carries the right sign but is insignificant 
and representation has a positive and significant coefficient, arguably due to the inclusion of 
three control variables in the regression that tend to move together with urbanization rate. 
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5. Interaction between Representation and Interstate 
Warfare 
In the previous section, we empirically investigated H3 and H4 that respectively 
posited representative regimes had a negative and a positive fiscal impact and did 
not find conclusive evidence for one or the other. Both of these hypotheses posited 
that representation had unconditional and direct fiscal impact. In this section, we 
turn to hypotheses that argue representation did matter, but its effect was contingent 
on warfare. Specifically, we review the arguments that respectively posit 
representative regime mattered by decreasing (H5) and increasing (H6) the effect of 
warfare on build-up of fiscal capacity and put these hypotheses to test. 
The hypotheses discussed in this section for the fiscal impact of political regime are 
contingent versions of those discussed in the previous section. The essence of 
representative assemblies is again identified as their role in solving collective action 
problems among the elites. The contingency here is that, since spending on warfare 
was by far the largest expenditure item for all European polities, and the domestic 
negotiation over taxation took place and the reorganization of fiscal military 
apparatus occurred during and for interstate warfare33, the differences between the 
fiscal impacts of representative and authoritarian regimes should have manifested 
themselves during episodes of war. Put differently, regime type mattered by 
mediating the impact of warfare on state building. 
Beyond this common premise, two different characterizations of the relationships 
between rulers and elites lead to two contrasting hypotheses regarding the 
representation-warfare interaction. The characterization that emphasizes the conflict 
between ruler and elites and the role of coercion in domestic politics argues that 
representative regimes performed worse under war pressure and undermined the 
impact of warfare on centralized state-building. An example to this line of reasoning 
is Downing’s discussion of Europe. In his treatment, in parts of Europe where war 
was protracted and war pressure was heavy, representative regimes did not fare well 
                                                        
33Bonney (1999), Bosker et al. (2011), Körner (1995). 
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in mobilizing domestic resources and could not compete with authoritarian regimes, 
whereas in regions where the pressure was light, this was not necessarily the case 
and representative regimes survived.34 Formally: 
H5: Centralized fiscal capacity had negative cross elasticity with 
respect to representation and interstate warfare. 
Alternatively, the extension of the characterization that emphasizes the role of 
consent in taxation argues for a positive interaction between representation and 
warfare. In this vein, Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997) and Rosenthal (1998) argue that 
in Western Europe representative regimes corresponded to a deal between ruler and 
domestic elites that entailed elites’ consent to financing warfare in exchange for a 
greater say in the control of the unified state apparatus.35 In formal terms: 
H6: Centralized fiscal capacity had positive cross elasticity with 
respect to representation and interstate warfare.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
To investigate H5 and H6, we add the interaction term between war pressure and 
representation as a regressor to different econometric specifications discussed 
previously and investigate its sign. We first do so for OLS with PCSE with two-way 
fixed effects specification. The regression equation is: 
 
 r  α  β  X′ γ θ	Urb  θWar  θRepr  θWar ∗ Repr  ε  
 
where εit exhibits heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Since both H5 and H6 
concern the cross derivative of log per capita tax over wage ratio with respect to war 
pressure and representation, the coefficient of interest is the coefficient of the 
interaction term: 
                                                        
34 Downing (1992). 
35 In the literature it is difficult to draw a clear cut line between works that posit representation 
had an unconditional positive fiscal impact (H4) and those that posit a positive interaction with 
warfare (H6), since the arguments are often multilayered. 
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∂r
∂War∂Repr  θ 
 
For the empirical evidence to lend support to H5, θ4 should be negative and 
significant, and for H6, positive and significant.  
Table 4 reports the regression results. As in table 1, in addition to the baseline 
specification 1, we report the estimates after controlling for nominal wage, 
population density and book production (2), employing a whole different set of 
proxies for urbanization, war pressure and representation without (3) and with the 
control variables (4), dropping England  (5) and Sweden, Prussia and Russia (6) from 
the sample. In none of the specifications the interaction term is significant at 10 per 
cent level. 
 
In Table 5, we model the dynamic nature of state capacity by including the lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor. Specifications 1-4 are OLS with PCSE, 5-6 by 
Arellano Bond dynamic estimation. The results are consistent across the 
specifications in that the interaction term is insignificant. 
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Lastly, in table 6, we employ two strategies to address endogeneity concerns. 
Specifications 1-4 are estimated using 2-Stage Least Squares estimation, where 
urbanization, representation and representation-war pressure interaction are 
instrumented by lagged values of urbanization and representation and the 
interaction of lagged value of representation with war pressure.  In specifications 5 
and 6, we estimate OLS with PCSE by including lagged values of urbanization and 
representation. The interaction terms are again insignificant at 10 per cent and hence 
do not lend support to either H5 or H6. 
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6. Interaction between Urbanisation, Representation and 
Interstate Warfare 
In the previous section, H5 and H6 were presented as alternative hypotheses arguing 
respectively that representation diminished and facilitated the impact of warfare on 
state-building, and the empirical evidence did not lend conclusive support for one or 
the other. In this section, we investigate yet a finer argument for the fiscal impact of 
regime types that does not characterize H5 and H6 as contradicting each other, but 
rather, as mechanisms that were respectively more relevant for rural and urban 
economies. This characterization builds on the insight that whether representative 
assemblies worked towards or against expansion of a centralized fiscal-military 
apparatus in early modern Europe was contingent on the socio-economic structure of 
the polity, because economy determined the leverages and the incentives of the sides 
to the domestic bargain. In what follows, we first review the basis for this argument 
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and then put to test the conjectured three-way relationship between urbanization, 
representation and warfare. 
The argument we investigate in this section is consistent with the theoretical 
framework of the preceding sections, in that the impact of a representative regime is 
again reduced to its positive effect on the collective action and organizational 
capacity of the elites, and that regime’s fiscal effect manifests itself mainly under 
pressure of war. The contingency introduced to the argument is that depending on 
elite incentives and leverage in the bargain, the gain in collective action capacity due 
to representation could work both ways. In particular, if the incentives of domestic 
elites were to restrict the fiscal and coercive capacity of the central state and retain 
prerogatives at the local level, then, as conjectured in H5, representative assemblies 
acted as nodes of resistance and precluded or slowed down fiscal centralization.  
Conversely, to the extent domestic elites had the incentive to fund the central 
treasury for the war effort and their consent mattered, then, as conjectured in H6, 
representative institutions reduced the transaction costs of bargaining and solved 
commitment issues. 
For the determinants of the position of the elites in the bargain, the literature 
conjectures a number of ways through which the distinction between rural-agrarian 
and urbanized-commercial economies altered the make-up, the leverage and 
motivations of domestic elites. For rural landowning elites, control over coercion was 
crucial both for surplus extraction from the agrarian sector and in defending their 
interests in domestic politics.36 However, urbanization, commercialization and 
commodification of labour severed the link between coercion and control over 
economic resources. Hence, if the need arose for building a centralized army, 
urbanized elites were less averse to ceding the domestic coercive control. Working 
towards the same effect, with commercialization, and in particular, the rise of 
international trade, urban interests increasingly stood to gain from interstate war-
making over commerce and colonies. These potential gains made increasing taxation 
and expansion of the centralized fiscal-military apparatus tolerable for the urban 
                                                        
36 Ardant (1975). 
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interests.37 It is also argued that urbanization and capital accumulation undermined 
the effectiveness of coercion for taxation. This was because relative to land and labor 
that were the main taxable resources in rural and agrarian economies, capital was 
more mobile, harder to monitor and seize solely by force.38 Consequently, with 
urbanization, representative regimes performed better in responding to the intense 
warfare of the period. Formally: 
H7: The cross elasticity of centralized fiscal capacity with respect to 
urbanization, representation, and warfare is positive. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
In this section we extend the empirical models to investigate H7.  To do so, we 
include the three-way interaction term between the proxies for representation, war 
pressure and urbanization as a regressor. For unbiased estimation, it is also necessary 
to include the three two-way interaction terms. Hence, the baseline regression 
equation for OLS with PCSE estimation is: 
r  α  β  X′ γ θ	Urb  θWar  θRepr  θWar ∗ Repr 
θWar ∗ Urb  θRepr ∗ Urb  θWar ∗ Repr ∗ Urb  ε  
H7 states that the cross derivative of log per capita tax wage over ratio with respect 
to pressure of war, representation and urbanization, θ, is positive and significant: 
∂r
∂War∂Repr ∂Urb  θ 
Table 7 reports the estimation results. In five of the six specifications, θis positive 
and significant at 10 per cent level. Only in specification 7, where Sweden, Russia 
and Prussia are dropped from the sample, it carries the right sign but is marginally 
insignificant at 10 per cent. The series for these polities reflect the experiences of the 
                                                        
37 For example, see O’Brien (1988). 
38 For a theoretical model, see Bates and Lien (1985). Also see Moore (2008) and the discussion 
in Hoffman and Norberg (1994) p. 312. 
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latecomers and their exclusion might have resulted in loss of a critical source of 
variation.  
 
Table 8 reruns the dynamic OLS with lagged dependent variable and Arellano Bond 
estimation for the full set of two-way and three-way interactions. The coefficient of 
the three-way interaction term is positive and statistical significance levels are higher 
compared to baseline results. 
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Lastly, in Table 9, we report the results for two strategies we employ against 
endogeneity. In specifications 1 and 2, urbanization proxy Urbdec and its two and 
three way interactions are proxied by 5 decades lagged value of Urbdec and its two 
and three-way interactions.  In specifications 3 and 4, representation proxy Parl and 
its two and three way interactions are proxied by its 10 decades lagged value of Parl 
and its two and three-way interactions.  Specifications 5 and 6 do the same, this time 
with representation proxy Ctax. Lastly, specifications 7 and 8 are estimated by OLS 
with PCSE using lagged values of urbanization and representation proxies. Except 
for specification 5, the coefficient of the three-way interaction term is positive and 
significant at 10 per cent or higher.39 
                                                        
39 It is worth highlighting how these findings qualify the econometric analysis in sections 4 and 5 
that did not allow for higher order interactions. In a regression that omits interaction terms, the 
estimated effect of representation is the weighted average of the effect of representation 
contingent on urbanization and warfare levels. The weights used in the averaging are determined 
by the distribution of urbanization and warfare levels in the sample. Hence, the result that 
representation improved central fiscal performance for certain urbanization-warfare 
combinations and undermined it at others is not inconsistent with the results in the previous 
section where representation did not have an overall positive effect and its fiscal impact did not 
vary with urbanization.   
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7. Discussion and Implications 
The empirical results lend support to the conjectured impact of the rate of 
urbanization on the relative effectiveness of coercive and consensual taxation and in 
turn on the relative fiscal performances of authoritarian and representative regimes. 
In particular, for rural-agrarian economies, they suggest that authoritarian regimes 
tended to perform better in building centralized state apparatus in response to the 
stimuli of warfare. It is instructive to interpret this finding based on the evidence on 
Eastern Europe, where development of markets for labour and land lagged, serfdom 
persisted into the 19th century, and rulers and elites remained landlords.40 Consistent 
with the empirical results, while the authoritarian regimes in Prussia and Russia 
achieved gains, Poland-Lithuania experienced the breakdown of centralized 
authority and eventual political demise. 
In contrast, at higher urbanization rates, representative regimes tended to perform 
better in financing interstate warfare. Fiscal performance of England during the 17th 
century, which experienced more than three-fold increase in per capita tax revenues, 
provides a case in point. As measured by our proxies, 17th century England ranked 
high in terms of representativeness of political regime, but in this respect there was 
little change from the 16th century.41 What did change in the 17th century was an 
increase in urbanization rate from less than 6 per cent to more than 13 per cent.  Our 
results suggest that, in addition to any direct positive it effect might have had on tax 
revenues, urbanization also drove the gains indirectly by improving the 
representative regime’s effectiveness in raising revenue for the wars England 
engaged in each decade of the century. 
The discussion of 17th century England also closely relates to the debate over the 
political regime for this period between the views that argue respectively for its 
continuity and a structural break.42 We identify continuity in regime type, but a break 
in its performance. This finding is worth discussing, because it helps clarify a 
                                                        
40 Bonney (1995). 
41 Parl increased from 0.59 to 0.73, whereas Ctax stayed constant at 1. 
42 Compare, for example, North and Weingast (1989) with Murrell (2009).   
K. Kıvanç Karaman & Şevket Pamuk 
 
33   
methodological choice implicit in our analysis and its relevance for the results. We 
identify continuity in regime type, because the empirical model employs two 
minimal, objectively quantifiable and input based proxies, namely the existence of an 
assembly with prerogatives over taxation (Ctax) and its meeting frequency (Parl). 
These proxies do not measure changes in the finer attributes of the regimes. Rather, 
the empirical framework treats the finer attributes as an intervening variable 
between the interaction of a regime type with its environment and the performance 
of the regime type. This choice serves to avoid the pitfalls of subjective evaluation 
and coding of regime types, an issue particularly relevant for a long term cross 
country study like this one. More importantly, it allows us to investigate the deeper 
determinants of the functioning of regime types, at the cost abstracting away from 
specific attributes and institutional innovations.43 
An immediate implication of the contrasting performance of regime types across 
different environments is that a strong state in a rural economy might be driven by a 
different regime type and thus has a different underlying political logic than a strong 
state in an urban economy. For example, by the second half of the 18th century, 
Prussia and England both had similar and high state capacities, collecting 
respectively, 13.8 and 13.7 days of unskilled wages per capita as central government 
revenues. Yet Prussia did so with an authoritarian regime and England with a 
representative regime, and in this, our findings suggest, the respective urbanization 
rates of 5.6 and 18.5 per cent played a role. Consequently, despite mobilizing similar 
shares of their polity’s resources, since different sets of political rules governed 
decision making over taxation and spending, these were essentially different kinds of 
states.  
Taking this line of argument further, our framework suggests that in different 
economic environments states faced different trade-offs between state capacity and 
                                                        
43 When in the third stage regressions we employ Acemoglu et.al.’s (2004) measure of constraints 
on the exercise of arbitrary power by the executive as the proxy for representation, the 
coefficient of the three-way interaction term carries the predicted positive sign but tends to be 
statistically weaker and  is significant only in some of the specifications. This is consistent with 
the discussion above, since this proxy codes by itself  the changes in the functioning of the regime 
that in other specifications is captured by the interaction term. 
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state autonomy over spending decisions.  In the rural-agrarian setting, higher state 
capacity was associated with the repression of rival elites through authoritarian 
governments and consequently with higher state autonomy from elites. In contrast, 
for urban-commercial economies, increases in state capacity occurred at the cost of 
state autonomy, because consent-seeking through representative regimes 
necessitated bargaining not only over revenue but also over spending decisions.44 In 
fact, as the English and Dutch experiences corroborate, for a representative regime in 
a polity beyond a certain level of urbanization it becomes difficult to speak of a ruler 
and state apparatus as distinct and autonomous from domestic elites. 
Our findings are also consistent with the literature emphasizing the greater capacity 
of representative regimes to issue public debt, and in turn, the role of public debt in 
the rise of modern states.45 The polities where public debt was raised mostly had 
urbanized economies with liquid capital. This is the same set of polities for which we 
find evidence for greater effectiveness of representative regimes in war financing. In 
other words, the two mechanisms worked towards the same effect. We also want to 
argue, however, public debt was ultimately underpinned by the expanding 
revenues. In other words, the basis for the growth in state capacity in this period was 
taxation, above all.46 
Finally, while this study focused on identifying the impacts of societal variables on 
state capacity and thus modelled it as the dependent variable, state capacity also 
acted as an independent variable altering the environment and in particular the 
economy it operated in. Without identifying state’s impact on economy, the positive 
impact this study identifies from economic development to state capacity provides 
an incomplete specification of the state-building process, because in the long run the 
former impact might have magnified or undermined the latter. Specifically, if a 
strong state fostered economic activity, in other words, if there were positive 
feedbacks in both directions, this would suggest a virtuous cycle of state-building 
                                                        
44 See Timmons (2005) and Ross (2004) for the two-dimensional bargaining argument based on 
evidence from modern democracies. 
45 North and Weingast (1989), Dickson (1967). 
46 Brewer (1989), O’Brien (1988).
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and economic development was at work. If, on the other hand, an increase in state 
capacity depressed economic activity, as would be the case if it meant a greater tax 
burden on taxpayers, this would imply that long term gains in state capacity due to 
economic development were less than the immediate gains.   
While a comprehensive empirical investigation is beyond the scope of this study, our 
findings offer qualified support for the positive economic impact of state capacity 
and a virtuous cycle of state-building. This is because our study provides empirical 
evidence for increases in central treasury revenues, not increases in the tax burden on 
economic activity. When interpreted together with the historical and theoretical 
accounts of early modern state-building, these revenue figures lead to a formulation 
of state-building as a process of restructuring of the intra-elite relations towards 
monopolization of fiscal and military capacity. This formulation for the economic 
impact of the state relates most closely to the chain of impact from monopolization of 
violence to regularization of taxation, gains in public and national security and in 
turn to economic growth.  The qualification, on the other hand, comes from the 
finding that the same level of state capacity corresponded to different political logics 
in different economic resource environments. Accordingly, its impact on growth was 
not necessarily the same.47  
 
8. Fiscal Centralisation during the 19th Century  
There were several important developments during the 19th century which, in our 
view, makes it very different than the early modern era in terms of the determinants 
and dynamics of fiscal capacity. First, with industrialization and advent of mass 
armies, domestic politics ceased to be an intra-elite game and states came 
increasingly in contact with ordinary citizens. In particular, dissent by the masses, 
rather than elites, became the principal political concern.48 This also began to alter 
another empirical pattern our analysis builds on, that taxes were spent on warfare. 
                                                        
47 For a comprehensive review of the role of early modern states in economy, see Vries (2002). 
48 Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). 
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Instead, frequency of wars dropped sharply, and public services began to consume 
increasing shares of state budgets. For these reasons, we believe a different model is 
needed to help explain the changing patterns fiscal centralization during this period. 
As a result, we have decided to limit ourselves to providing an overview of the 
nineteenth century trends and not include them in the econometric analysis. 
Per capita tax revenues of most European states continued to rise both in grams of 
silver and in inflation adjusted terms during the nineteenth century. However, in 
contrast to the early modern period when increases in per capita incomes had been 
rather limited and gains in revenues were driven primarily by gains in fiscal capacity 
as measured by tax over income ratios, there were significant, continent-wide gains 
in per capita incomes while tax revenue over income ratios showed considerable 
variation. In some countries, including Great Britain, Netherlands and Prussia, per 
capita tax revenues rose more slowly than per capita incomes. In other words, tax 
revenue over income ratios declined. In France and Spain, on the other hand, the 
ratio of per capita tax revenues over either daily wages or per capita GDP continued 
to advance until World War I. Similarly, in the countries of southern and eastern 
Europe where fiscal capacity had been more limited before the nineteenth century, 
per capita revenues of the states rose faster than per capita incomes. Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire fit this pattern as well. In other words, fiscal capacity defined by the 
ratio of per capita tax revenues over either daily wages or per capita GDP was 
stronger in the periphery than in Western Europe during the nineteenth century.49 
 
9. Conclusion 
The first part of this study discussed the standardized measures of centralized state 
capacity we have constructed for early modern Europe and the patterns they reveal. 
Specifically, we brought together the central treasury tax revenue series for major 
European states adjusting them for differences in monetary units and changes in 
population, prices and income. In broad terms, our series have identified large 
                                                        
49  Maddison (2007),  Karaman and Pamuk (2010). 
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increases in the resource mobilization capacity of states across the continent. They 
have also indicated that earlier revenue increases in the West than in the East and 
large variations within each. When compared with the fragmentary evidence 
available for other regions of the world, it is clear these large gains in fiscal capacity 
were peculiar to Europe.50 This widening of differences between state capacities both 
within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world during the early 
modern era help explain the shifts in the continental balance of power as well as the 
growing material superiority and hegemony of the European states around the 
world. Our findings also relate to the debate regarding the timing and determinants 
of the onset of modern growth. In particular, they strongly point to an early 
divergence for Europe in the form of a growing role for centralized states that 
predated the 19th century industrialization and increase in average incomes.   
These patterns we have identified emphasize the role played by the changes in the 
nature and capacity of states in the long term trajectory of Europe. From an economic 
perspective, the monopolization of coercion that predated the Industrial Revolution 
suggests the gains in internal security might have played a major role in the 
development process. More broadly, these patterns qualify the view of state as a 
predatory and autonomous actor in domestic politics and a strong state as inherently 
inimical to growth. They also suggest a more complex relationship where the state 
itself and its role in society is the outcome of the interaction of different societal 
forces. 
In the second part, we have investigated the factors that drove these gains in state 
capacity in Europe. In the first stage of the analysis, working under the premise that 
their impacts worked independently and unconditionally, we found that changes in 
economic structure and interstate warfare had positive fiscal effects, while there was 
no empirical support for a positive or negative effect of elite representation. In the 
second and third stages, we made explicit the interaction of representative regime 
with warfare and then with economic structure. The argument we found empirical 
                                                        
50  The most appropriate comparison is with states in Asia.  See Ma (2010) for China, Nakabayashi 
(2008) for Japan, Moosvi (2008) for India, and Arjomand (1989) and Floor (1999) for Iran. 
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support for was that differences in economic structure induced differences in relative 
effectiveness of coercion and consent for taxation and consequently altered the 
relative fiscal performance of the regime types. Specifically, it was authoritarian 
regimes in rural economies and representative regimes in urban economies that 
tended to better withstand war pressure and translate it into building of a centralized 
state apparatus.   
Implicit in the mechanisms of state-building we have identified are premises that 
were peculiar to Europe and in this sense our findings beg the question further. For 
one, Europe was unique during the early modern era in terms of the intensity and 
spread of interstate warfare, one of the drivers of state-building. We have also found 
that representative assemblies, under certain conditions, facilitated state building, 
and for this period in history they were also specific to Europe. Hence, the evidence 
suggests it was the juxtapositioning of Europe’s geofigurey and historical heritage 
with period specific factors that set in motion the process of state-building across the 
continent.  
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Appendix: Proxies for War Pressure 
Quantifying the pressure of warfare for a polity is complicated by the fact that each 
year each polity may have engaged in more than one war, the belligerents formed 
coalitions, the intensity of each war varied, and the pressure on war participants 
varied depending on their proximity to center of gravity of the conflict.  We construct 
and employ two proxies for per capita war pressure that takes these factors into 
account. 
The notation is as follows. Countries are indexed by i,j,k ∈ C, wars are indexed by 
w∈ W, years are indexed by t∈ 1500,1501. .1800 . Pop, denotes population of 
polity i at year t, Caus%, the total causality due to war w at year t, Dist,), the 
distances between capitals cities of countries i and j at year t. I,%, is an indicator that 
takes value 1 if polity i participates in war w at year t and zero otherwise. For each 
war w polity i participates at year t, we denote the set of i’s allies with A,%, ⊂ C and 
the set of i’s opponents with  B,%, ⊂ C.51 
The first index, Pwar, calculates the war pressure for polity k at year t as follows: 
Pwar/, 0
∑ Pop),)∈23,4,5
∑ Pop,∈63,4,5∪23,4,5
Caus%,
∑ Pop,∈63,4,5∪23,w,5
I/,%,%∈8  
The first term,	 ∑ 9:;<,5<∈=3,4,5∑ 9:;>,5>∈?3,4,5∪=3,4,5  is the ratio of the total population of k’s adversaries 
in war w at year t to total population of the war participants.  The second term, 
@ABC4,5
∑ 9:;>,5>∈?3,4,5∪=3,4,5
	, calculates the ratio of total causality to total population of war 
participants. These two terms together determine the pressure on k at year t due to 
war w. We then add the pressures across different wars k participates at year t. 
Our second and main index also takes the distances between polities into account: 
                                                        
51 The data on duration, participants and causality for wars is based on Clodfelter (2002). We 
include all interstate wars the countries in the sample took part it in except for colonial wars.  
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Dpwar/, 0
∑ Pop),Dist/,),)∈23,4,5
∑ Pop,∈63,4,5∪23,4,5
Caus%,
∑ Pop,∈63,4,5∪23,4,5
I/,%,%∈8  
Note, in this index, the populations of the members of opponent coalition are 
discounted by their distance to k. 
As we did for other variables we calculate decade averages of these yearly indexes. 
We also rescale each index to vary between 0 and 1, 1 corresponding to the highest 
value of war pressure for a decade any polity in the sample experiences over the 
three centuries. 
These two indexes rest on a number of assumptions on the nature of war pressure. 
For one, we assume that the war pressure for polity k in war w is proportional to the 
total population of the coalition it is a part of and inversely proportional to the total 
population of opponents’ coalition. In other words, population is used as a proxy of a 
polity’s resources for warfare.52  The ratio of causality to total population of war 
participants is included to capture the differences in intensity across different wars. 
Lastly, in our second proxy, it is assumed that the farther away a polity is from a 
particular opponent, the lower the threat and the pressure.  
                         
 
 
  
                                                        
52 An alternative would be to use the ratio of centralized tax revenues as the proxy for the ratio of 
military resources. We prefer to use the ratio of populations for two reasons. For one, the states 
in our sample, particularly in the early part of the period under study and in Eastern Europe, 
could mobilize manpower for warfare without centralized monetary taxation, making population 
the better measure of resources. We also prefer ratio of populations since tax revenues would 
create serious endogeneity issues in estimation. 
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